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The philosophy of science

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1 International Union of the History and Philosophy of Science

Abbreviation: IUHPS

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > International Union of the History and Philosophy of Science
2 Philosophy

   1) There Are Ideas That Have Their Own True and Immutable Nature

   And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)

   2) Examine What Is within Our Reach

   Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)

   3) Modern Philosophy Starts with the Cartesian Catastrophe

   As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)

   4) The Rightful Claims of Philosophy

   It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the inﬂuence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic inﬂuences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)

   5) The Philosophy of Philosophy

   Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)

   6) Philosophy Is a Field Which Has Certain Central Questions

   I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)

   7) The Central Task of Philosophy

   What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.

   This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).

   The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....

   Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)

   8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science

   In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)

   9) The Enduring Value of Philosophy

   Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....

   Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)

    10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- Control

   In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.

■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

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■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.

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■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

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■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

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■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.

■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
4 filosofía de la ciencia

(n.) = philosophy of science

Ex. The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

* * *

(n.) = philosophy of science

Ex: The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Spanish-English dictionary > filosofía de la ciencia
5 acabarse

pron.v.

to finish, to stop, to come to an end; to die, to run out.

¡Se acabó it's all over

* * *

acabarse

► verbo pronominal

1 to end, finish, come to an end (no quedar) to run out

■ el partido se acabó con empate a dos goles the match ended in a two-all draw

■ se acabó la fiesta the party's over

■ se le acaba el contrato el mes que viene his contract runs out next month

■ se nos ha acabado el butano we've run out of butane

* * *

1) to finish, come to an end

2) run out

* * *

VPR

1) (=terminarse) [acto, reunión] to finish, come to an end; [reservas] to run out

la impresora te avisa cuando se acaba el papel — the printer tells you when the paper runs out

todo se acabó para él — * he's had it *

¡se acabó! — that's it!

¡un minuto más y se acabó! — one more minute and that will be it!

¡te quedas aquí y se acabó! — you're staying here and that's that!

le das el dinero y se acabó — just give her the money and be done with it

-... y san se acabó

2) [con complemento indirecto]

se me ha acabado el tabaco — I'm out of cigarettes

pronto se nos acabará la gasolina — we'll soon be out of petrol

se me acabó la paciencia — my patience is exhausted o at an end, I've run out of patience

3) [con valor enfático]

acábate el café y nos vamos — drink your coffee up and we'll go

4) [persona] (=morir) to die; esp LAm (=cansarse) to wear o.s. out

* * *

(v.) = draw to + a close, peter out, run out, be gone, come to + an end, run out of, draw to + an end, wind down, be all gone

Ex. In 1971 the experimental phase of PRECIS was drawing to a close as the system became operational in the British national bibliography.

Ex. Press demands for information soon petered out but enquiries from the general public continued for many months.

Ex. He continued writing for two years until his ink ran out.

Ex. Hard times lie ahead, the halcyon days are gone -- perhaps forever.

Ex. The era of paper-based information systems is coming to an end.

Ex. The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Ex. As the war drew to an end, the horrendous scenes of misery and destitution came to light.

Ex. As President Bush's second term winds down, this is no time for him to be making trouble for his successor.

Ex. The hall is quiet, the band has packed up, and the munchies are all gone.

* * *

(v.) = draw to + a close, peter out, run out, be gone, come to + an end, run out of, draw to + an end, wind down, be all gone

Ex: In 1971 the experimental phase of PRECIS was drawing to a close as the system became operational in the British national bibliography.

Ex: Press demands for information soon petered out but enquiries from the general public continued for many months.

Ex: He continued writing for two years until his ink ran out.

Ex: Hard times lie ahead, the halcyon days are gone -- perhaps forever.

Ex: The era of paper-based information systems is coming to an end.

Ex: The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Ex: As the war drew to an end, the horrendous scenes of misery and destitution came to light.

Ex: As President Bush's second term winds down, this is no time for him to be making trouble for his successor.

Ex: The hall is quiet, the band has packed up, and the munchies are all gone.

* * *

■acabarse verbo reflexivo to finish, come to an end: se nos acabó el aceite, we ran out of olive oil
exclamación familiar ¡se acabó!, that's that!
' acabarse' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
terminarse
- acabar
English:
draw
- end
- give out
- go
- run

* * *

vpr

1. [agotarse] to be used up, to be gone;

se nos ha acabado la gasolina we're out of petrol o US gas;

se ha acabado la comida there's no more food left;

se ha acabado la leche the milk has run out, we've run out of milk;

no corras tanto, se te acabarán las fuerzas don't run so fast, you'll run out of energy

2. [terminar] [guerra, película] to finish, to be over

3. [consumir] [comida] to eat up;

¡acábatelo todo y no dejes ni una miga! make sure you eat it all up!

4. RP, Ven Fam [tener un orgasmo] to come

5. Comp

¡se acabó! [¡basta ya!] that's enough!;
[se terminó] that's it, then!;
¡te quedarás en casa y (san) se acabó! you'll stay at home and that's that o that's the end of it!;

se acabó lo que se daba that is/was the end of that;
Méx Fam
no acabársela: no me la acabo con la cantidad de trabajo que hay I can't deal with the amount of work we've got

* * *

acabarse

v/r de actividad finish, end; de pan, dinero run out;

se nos ha acabado el azúcar we’ve run out of sugar;

¡se acabó! that’s it!, that’s that!

* * *

vr

terminarse: to come to an end, to run out

se me acabó el dinero: I ran out of money

* * *

acabarse vb to run out [pt. ran; pp. run]

se nos ha acabado el pan we've run out of bread

se me acabó el dinero I ran out of money

¡se acabó! that's it!

Spanish-English dictionary > acabarse
6 agotarse

pron.v.

to become exhausted; to be finished.

* * *

agotarse

► verbo pronominal

1 (cansarse) to become exhausted, become tired out

2 (gastarse) to run out

3 COMERCIO to be sold out

* * *

1) to get exhausted, tire oneself out, wear oneself out

2) sell out

* * *

VPR

1) (=cansarse) to get exhausted, tire o.s. out, wear o.s. out

me agoto pronto nadando — I soon get exhausted when I swim, I soon tire o wear myself out when I swim, swimming soon tires o wears me out

2) [mercancía, artículo, género] to sell out

se han agotado las entradas para el concierto — tickets for the concert have sold out

ese producto se nos ha agotado — we've sold out of that product, that product is o has sold out

3) [recursos, reservas] to run out

se me agotó la gasolina — I ran out of petrol

se me agotaron los argumentos para defender mi tesis — I ran out of arguments to defend my thesis

se me está agotando la paciencia — my patience is running out o wearing thin

4) [prórroga, tiempo] to run out

el tiempo se iba agotando — time was running out

el plazo se agota mañana — the deadline is tomorrow

* * *

(v.) = run down, peter out, run + short (of), run out, go out of + print, sell out, dry up, run out of, run + dry, be all gone

Ex. A closed system will be subject to entropy -- the tendency for a system to run down through the loss of differentiation.

Ex. Press demands for information soon petered out but enquiries from the general public continued for many months.

Ex. The arguments are well known but we must realise that there was a very real fear that society would run short of manual labour = Los argumentos son bien conocidos pero debemos darnos cuenta de que había existía un miedo real de que la sociedad se quedase sin mano de obra.

Ex. He continued writing for two years until his ink ran out.

Ex. Zilg claims that his book 'Du Pont: Behind the nylon Curtain', which is highly critical of Du Pont, was allowed to go out of print prematurely as a direct result of pressure being brought to bear on the publisher by Du Pont.

Ex. The first edition was quickly sold out, and I decided to revise it in the light of comments by colleagues and reviewers, and of developments in my own thinking.

Ex. The article 'Slim chance for ethnic funding' explains how funding for library projects to provide assistance to ethnic minorities has almost dried up.

Ex. The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Ex. So stop fretting that UK unemployment is rising as the tax burden soars, consumers stop spending and North Sea oil runs dry.

Ex. The hall is quiet, the band has packed up, and the munchies are all gone.

* * *

(v.) = run down, peter out, run + short (of), run out, go out of + print, sell out, dry up, run out of, run + dry, be all gone

Ex: A closed system will be subject to entropy -- the tendency for a system to run down through the loss of differentiation.

Ex: Press demands for information soon petered out but enquiries from the general public continued for many months.

Ex: The arguments are well known but we must realise that there was a very real fear that society would run short of manual labour = Los argumentos son bien conocidos pero debemos darnos cuenta de que había existía un miedo real de que la sociedad se quedase sin mano de obra.

Ex: He continued writing for two years until his ink ran out.

Ex: Zilg claims that his book 'Du Pont: Behind the nylon Curtain', which is highly critical of Du Pont, was allowed to go out of print prematurely as a direct result of pressure being brought to bear on the publisher by Du Pont.

Ex: The first edition was quickly sold out, and I decided to revise it in the light of comments by colleagues and reviewers, and of developments in my own thinking.

Ex: The article 'Slim chance for ethnic funding' explains how funding for library projects to provide assistance to ethnic minorities has almost dried up.

Ex: The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Ex: So stop fretting that UK unemployment is rising as the tax burden soars, consumers stop spending and North Sea oil runs dry.

Ex: The hall is quiet, the band has packed up, and the munchies are all gone.

* * *

■agotarse verbo reflexivo
1 (terminarse las existencias, la paciencia) to run out, be used up
Com to be sold out
2 (cansarse) to become exhausted o tired out
' agotarse' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
agotar
English:
give out
- go
- run down
- run out
- short
- wear
- dry
- run
- sell

* * *

vpr

1. [cansarse] to tire oneself out, to exhaust oneself;

se agotó con la caminata the walk tired him out o exhausted him

2. [acabarse] to run out;
[libro, disco, entradas] to sell out;
se nos agotaron las provisiones our provisions ran out;

las entradas se agotaron en seguida the tickets sold out almost immediately;

se nos ha agotado ese modelo that model has sold out;

se me está agotando la paciencia my patience is running out o wearing thin

3. [pila, batería] to go flat

* * *

agotarse

v/r

1 ( cansarse) get worn out, exhaust o.s.

2 ( terminarse) run out, become exhausted

3 ( venderse) sell out;

la primera edición se ha agotado the first edition has sold out

* * *

vr

* * *

agotarse vb

1. (en general) to run out [pt. ran; pp. run]

se le está agotando la paciencia his patience is running out

2. (existencias) to sell out [pt. & pp. sold]

las entradas se han agotado the tickets have sold out

Spanish-English dictionary > agotarse
7 quedarse sin

v.

1 to miss the opportunity to, to lose the chance to.

María se quedó sin ver a su ídolo Mary missed the opportunity to see her idol.

2 to run out of, to go short of, to lack, to be out of.

Nos quedamos sin gasolina We ran out of gasoline.

3 to be left without, to be left alone without.

Nos quedamos sin dinero We were left alone without money.

* * *

(v.) = run + short (of), miss out on, run out of, run out

Ex. The arguments are well known but we must realise that there was a very real fear that society would run short of manual labour = Los argumentos son bien conocidos pero debemos darnos cuenta de que había existía un miedo real de que la sociedad se quedase sin mano de obra.

Ex. The author regrets the struggle which Greco-Roman studies have to survive in the USA arguing that US students miss out on understanding the origins of much of their culture and government.

Ex. The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Ex. He continued writing for two years until his ink ran out.

* * *

(v.) = run + short (of), miss out on, run out of, run out

Ex: The arguments are well known but we must realise that there was a very real fear that society would run short of manual labour = Los argumentos son bien conocidos pero debemos darnos cuenta de que había existía un miedo real de que la sociedad se quedase sin mano de obra.

Ex: The author regrets the struggle which Greco-Roman studies have to survive in the USA arguing that US students miss out on understanding the origins of much of their culture and government.

Ex: The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Ex: He continued writing for two years until his ink ran out.

Spanish-English dictionary > quedarse sin
8 dimensión temporal

(n.) = time dimension

Ex. The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

* * *

(n.) = time dimension

Ex: The philosophy of science lacks a time dimension and seems to have run out of language to cope with all the abstractions needed.

Spanish-English dictionary > dimensión temporal
9 filosofía

f.

philosophy, ideology.

* * *

filosofía

► nombre femenino

1 philosophy

\

FRASEOLOGÍA

tomarse algo con filosofía to take something philosophically

* * *

noun f.

philosophy

* * *

SF philosophy

tomarse las cosas con filosofía — to take things philosophically

filosofía de la ciencia — philosophy of science

filosofía de la vida — philosophy of life

filosofía moral — moral philosophy

filosofía natural — natural philosophy
facultad 3)
* * *

femenino philosophy

tómate las cosas con filosofía — (fam) you have to be philosophical about things

* * *

= philosophy, philosophy.

Ex. For example, class R philosophy is first divided into such canonical divisions as Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Aesthetics.

Ex. Let us attempt to examine first the thinking and philosophy behind the arrangement of libraries designed in this period.

----

* filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.

* filosofía de vida = philosophy of life.

* filosofía educativa = educational philosophy.

* filosofía y letras = arts and humanities, the, arts and letters.

* la filosofía de = the reason behind, the reasoning behind.

* seguir una filosofía = espouse + philosophy.

* * *

femenino philosophy

tómate las cosas con filosofía — (fam) you have to be philosophical about things

* * *

= philosophy, philosophy.

Ex: For example, class R philosophy is first divided into such canonical divisions as Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Aesthetics.

Ex: Let us attempt to examine first the thinking and philosophy behind the arrangement of libraries designed in this period.

* filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.

* filosofía de vida = philosophy of life.

* filosofía educativa = educational philosophy.

* filosofía y letras = arts and humanities, the, arts and letters.

* la filosofía de = the reason behind, the reasoning behind.

* seguir una filosofía = espouse + philosophy.

* * *

filosofía

feminine

1 (sistema, doctrina) philosophy

2 (enfoque) philosophy

tiene una filosofía de la vida muy personal she has her own very personal outlook on life o philosophy

tómate las cosas con filosofía ( fam); you have to be philosophical about things

* * *

filosofía sustantivo femenino
philosophy
filosofía sustantivo femenino
1 philosophy
2 familiar con filosofía, (con paciencia) philosophically, calmly
' filosofía' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
puesta
- puesto
- salida
- calar
- facultad
- licenciado
English:
body
- MA
- MPhil
- PhD
- philosophy
- bachelor
- philosophic

* * *

filosofía nf

1. [estudio] philosophy

Comp
filosofía del lenguaje philosophy of language;
Filosofía y Letras humanities;

filosofía moral moral philosophy;

filosofía natural natural philosophy

2. [ideas] philosophy;

no entiendo la filosofía de estos cambios I don't understand the thinking behind these changes;

tiene una filosofía del trabajo muy distinta a la mía she has a very different attitude to work to me

3. [resignación]
tomarse algo con filosofía to be philosophical about sth

* * *

filosofía

f philosophy

* * *

filosofía nf

: philosophy

* * *

filosofía n philosophy

Spanish-English dictionary > filosofía
10 Psychology

   1) The Knowledge of Ourselves

   We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)

   2) As a Science, Psychology Is Distinct

   The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)

   3) Psychology Can Never Be an Exact Natural Science

   Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)

   4) How a " Mathematical" Psychology May Be Realized in Practice

   It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)

   5) The Rights of Psychology as Science

   "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,

   6) The Study of Animal Psychology

   The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)

   7) The Behaviorist's Formulation

   The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)

   8) Man Is a Microcosm

   According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)

   9) Brief Overview of Psychology's History

   At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.

   In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.

   The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.

   Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)

    10) Psychological Research Is Not Building toward Systematic Clarity

   As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)

    11) Psychology as a Scientific Discipline

   The subject matter of psychology is as old as reﬂection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology
11 ciencia

f.

1 science.

a ciencia cierta for certain

no se conoce a ciencia cierta el número de víctimas the number of victims isn't known for certain

ciencias económicas economics

ciencias exactas (singular) mathematics

ciencia ficción (singular) science fiction

ciencias de la información media studies

ciencias naturales natural sciences

ciencias ocultas occultism

ciencias políticas political science

ciencias sociales social sciences

2 learning, knowledge.

tener poca ciencia (informal) to be straightforward

por ciencia infusa (humorous) through divine inspiration

* * *

ciencia

► nombre femenino

1 (disciplina) science

2 (saber) knowledge, learning

\

FRASEOLOGÍA

saber algo a ciencia cierta figurado to know something for certain

ser un pozo de ciencia to be a well of knowledge

ciencia ficción science fiction

ciencia infusa intuition

ciencias empresariales business studies

ciencias exactas mathematics sing

ciencias naturales natural sciences

ciencias ocultas the occult sing

* * *

noun f.

science

* * *

SF

1) (=conocimiento) science

los avances de la ciencia — the advances of science

- saber algo a ciencia cierta

no tener mucha ciencia —

esto no tiene mucha ciencia — there's nothing difficult about it

ciencia ficción — science fiction

ciencia infusa, lo sabe por ciencia infusa — iró he has God-given intelligence

2) (=doctrina) science, sciences pl

un hombre de ciencia — a man of science

ciencias naturales — natural science sing

ciencias ocultas — occultism sing

ciencias sociales — social science, social sciences pl

3) pl ciencias (Educ) science sing, sciences

estudia una carrera de ciencias — she's doing a science degree

Ciencias de la Educación — Education sing

Ciencias de la Información — Media Studies

Ciencias Económicas — Economics sing

Ciencias Empresariales — Business Studies

Ciencias Exactas — Exact Sciences

Ciencias Físicas — Physical Science sing

Ciencias Políticas — Political Science sing

* * *

femenino

a) ( rama del saber) science; (saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning

a ciencia cierta — for sure, for certain

no tiene ninguna ciencia — there's nothing complicated about it

b) ciencias femenino plural (Educ) science

- ciencia ficción

- Ciencias Empresariales/de la Información

- ciencias ocultas

- Ciencias Políticas/de la Educación

* * *

= scholarship, science.

Ex. The most important of the functions of librarians is the collection, preservation and affording access to the materials of scholarship.

Ex. Thus we all agree that one component of a building is a roof (and not vice versa!), and that chemistry is a branch of science.

----

* academia de las ciencias = academy of sciences.

* a ciencia cierta = for sure, for certain.

* alfabetización en ciencias de la salud = health literacy.

* árbol de la ciencia, el = tree of knowledge, the.

* biblioteca de ciencias = science library.

* biblioteca de ciencias de la salud = health sciences library, health library.

* Biblioteca Nacional de Préstamo para la Ciencia y la Tecnología (NLL) = National Lending Library for Science and Technology (NLL).

* bibliotecario de ciencias de la salud = health librarian.

* bibliotecario de las ciencias de la salud = health sciences librarian.

* centro de las ciencias = science centre.

* ciencia aplicada = applied science.

* Ciencia Cristiana, la = Christian Science.

* ciencia de la comunicación = communication science.

* ciencia de las zonas polares = polar science.

* ciencia del conocimiento = cognitive science.

* ciencia del libro = bookmanship.

* ciencia de los alimentos = food science.

* ciencia del suelo = soil science.

* ciencia experimental = hard sciences, the.

* ciencia ficción = science fiction, sci-fi.

* ciencia forense = forensic science.

* ciencia médica = medical science.

* ciencia militar = military science.

* ciencia mundial = world science.

* ciencias = science and technology.

* ciencias agrícolas = agricultural economics.

* ciencias biológicas = biological sciences.

* ciencias biomédicas = biomedical sciences.

* ciencias de la atmósfera = atmospheric sciences.

* ciencias de la computación = computer science, computational science.

* ciencias de la computación y tecnología informática = computer science and technology.

* ciencias de la construcción = building sciences.

* ciencias de la documentación = information science, library science.

* ciencias de la educación = educational science.

* ciencias de la navegación = nautical science.

* ciencias de la salud = health sciences.

* ciencias de las plantas = plant science(s).

* ciencias de la tierra = geosciences.

* ciencias de la tierra, las = earth sciences, the.

* ciencias de la vida = biosciences.

* ciencias de la vida, las = life sciences, the.

* ciencias del comportamiento = behavioural sciences.

* ciencias del espacio, las = space science(s), the.

* ciencias del mar = aquatic sciences.

* ciencias del mar, las = ocean sciences, the.

* ciencias de los materiales = materials sciences.

* ciencias domésticas = domestic science.

* ciencias duras, las = hard sciences, the.

* ciencias exactas, las = exact sciences, the, hard sciences, the.

* ciencias físicas = physical science.

* ciencias forestales = forestry.

* ciencias históricas = historical sciences.

* ciencias humanas = human science.

* ciencias naturales = natural sciences.

* ciencias navales = ship science.

* ciencias planetarias, las = planetary sciences, the.

* ciencias políticas = political science.

* ciencias puras = pure sciences.

* ciencias sobre la vida en el espacio = space life sciences.

* ciencias sociales = social sciences, soft sciences, the, social studies.

* ciencia virtual = e-science.

* ciencia y tecnología = sci-tech [scitech o sci/tech].

* Ciencia y Tecnología (C + T) = S & T (Science and Technology).

* ciencia y tecnología de los alimentos = food science and technology.

* ciencia y tecnología de los materiales = materials science and technology.

* científico de las ciencias de la tierra = geoscientist.

* conocer a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.

* delegación de educación y ciencia = local education authority (LEA).

* enseñanza de las ciencias = science education.

* especialista en ciencias de la tierra = earth scientist.

* estudiante de ciencias de la educación = education student, student teacher.

* facultad de ciencias de la educación = teachers college, teacher training college.

* filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.

* Fundación Nacional para las Ciencias (NSF) = National Science Foundation (NSF).

* humanidades y ciencias sociales = arts and social sciences.

* Indice de Citas de Ciencia (SCI) = Science Citation Index (SCI).

* Indice de Citas de las Ciencias Sociales (SSCI) = Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).

* investigación en ciencias de la documentación = information science research.

* Licenciatura de Ciencias = M.Sc. (Master of Science).

* Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia = Department of Education and Science.

* mundo de la ciencia, el = world of science, the, scientific world, the.

* museo de ciencias naturales = natural science museum.

* museo de las ciencias = science museum.

* no es una ciencia exacta = not (exactly) rocket science.

* novela de ciencia ficción = science fiction novel.

* relacionado con las ciencias = science-related.

* revista de ciencia y tecnología = science and technology journal.

* saber a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.

* saber a ciencia cierta que = know + for a fact that.

* ser una ciencia exacta = be an exact science.

* sistema de la ciencia, el = system of science, the.

* tecnología de la información para ciencias de la salud = health informatics.

* * *

femenino

a) ( rama del saber) science; (saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning

a ciencia cierta — for sure, for certain

no tiene ninguna ciencia — there's nothing complicated about it

b) ciencias femenino plural (Educ) science

- ciencia ficción

- Ciencias Empresariales/de la Información

- ciencias ocultas

- Ciencias Políticas/de la Educación

* * *

= scholarship, science.

Ex: The most important of the functions of librarians is the collection, preservation and affording access to the materials of scholarship.

Ex: Thus we all agree that one component of a building is a roof (and not vice versa!), and that chemistry is a branch of science.

* academia de las ciencias = academy of sciences.

* a ciencia cierta = for sure, for certain.

* alfabetización en ciencias de la salud = health literacy.

* árbol de la ciencia, el = tree of knowledge, the.

* biblioteca de ciencias = science library.

* biblioteca de ciencias de la salud = health sciences library, health library.

* Biblioteca Nacional de Préstamo para la Ciencia y la Tecnología (NLL) = National Lending Library for Science and Technology (NLL).

* bibliotecario de ciencias de la salud = health librarian.

* bibliotecario de las ciencias de la salud = health sciences librarian.

* centro de las ciencias = science centre.

* ciencia aplicada = applied science.

* Ciencia Cristiana, la = Christian Science.

* ciencia de la comunicación = communication science.

* ciencia de las zonas polares = polar science.

* ciencia del conocimiento = cognitive science.

* ciencia del libro = bookmanship.

* ciencia de los alimentos = food science.

* ciencia del suelo = soil science.

* ciencia experimental = hard sciences, the.

* ciencia ficción = science fiction, sci-fi.

* ciencia forense = forensic science.

* ciencia médica = medical science.

* ciencia militar = military science.

* ciencia mundial = world science.

* ciencias = science and technology.

* ciencias agrícolas = agricultural economics.

* ciencias biológicas = biological sciences.

* ciencias biomédicas = biomedical sciences.

* ciencias de la atmósfera = atmospheric sciences.

* ciencias de la computación = computer science, computational science.

* ciencias de la computación y tecnología informática = computer science and technology.

* ciencias de la construcción = building sciences.

* ciencias de la documentación = information science, library science.

* ciencias de la educación = educational science.

* ciencias de la navegación = nautical science.

* ciencias de la salud = health sciences.

* ciencias de las plantas = plant science(s).

* ciencias de la tierra = geosciences.

* ciencias de la tierra, las = earth sciences, the.

* ciencias de la vida = biosciences.

* ciencias de la vida, las = life sciences, the.

* ciencias del comportamiento = behavioural sciences.

* ciencias del espacio, las = space science(s), the.

* ciencias del mar = aquatic sciences.

* ciencias del mar, las = ocean sciences, the.

* ciencias de los materiales = materials sciences.

* ciencias domésticas = domestic science.

* ciencias duras, las = hard sciences, the.

* ciencias exactas, las = exact sciences, the, hard sciences, the.

* ciencias físicas = physical science.

* ciencias forestales = forestry.

* ciencias históricas = historical sciences.

* ciencias humanas = human science.

* ciencias naturales = natural sciences.

* ciencias navales = ship science.

* ciencias planetarias, las = planetary sciences, the.

* ciencias políticas = political science.

* ciencias puras = pure sciences.

* ciencias sobre la vida en el espacio = space life sciences.

* ciencias sociales = social sciences, soft sciences, the, social studies.

* ciencia virtual = e-science.

* ciencia y tecnología = sci-tech [scitech o sci/tech].

* Ciencia y Tecnología (C + T) = S & T (Science and Technology).

* ciencia y tecnología de los alimentos = food science and technology.

* ciencia y tecnología de los materiales = materials science and technology.

* científico de las ciencias de la tierra = geoscientist.

* conocer a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.

* delegación de educación y ciencia = local education authority (LEA).

* enseñanza de las ciencias = science education.

* especialista en ciencias de la tierra = earth scientist.

* estudiante de ciencias de la educación = education student, student teacher.

* facultad de ciencias de la educación = teachers college, teacher training college.

* filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.

* Fundación Nacional para las Ciencias (NSF) = National Science Foundation (NSF).

* humanidades y ciencias sociales = arts and social sciences.

* Indice de Citas de Ciencia (SCI) = Science Citation Index (SCI).

* Indice de Citas de las Ciencias Sociales (SSCI) = Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).

* investigación en ciencias de la documentación = information science research.

* Licenciatura de Ciencias = M.Sc. (Master of Science).

* Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia = Department of Education and Science.

* mundo de la ciencia, el = world of science, the, scientific world, the.

* museo de ciencias naturales = natural science museum.

* museo de las ciencias = science museum.

* no es una ciencia exacta = not (exactly) rocket science.

* novela de ciencia ficción = science fiction novel.

* relacionado con las ciencias = science-related.

* revista de ciencia y tecnología = science and technology journal.

* saber a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.

* saber a ciencia cierta que = know + for a fact that.

* ser una ciencia exacta = be an exact science.

* sistema de la ciencia, el = system of science, the.

* tecnología de la información para ciencias de la salud = health informatics.

* * *

ciencia

feminine

1 (rama del saber) science; (saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning

los adelantos de la ciencia scientific advances, the advances of science

a ciencia cierta for sure, for certain

no tiene ninguna ciencia there's nothing difficult o complicated about it

2 ciencias fpl ( Educ) science

Compuestos:

● ciencia del suelo

soil science

● ciencia espacial

space science

● ciencia ficción

science fiction

● ciencia infusa

tiene la ciencia infusa ( iró); he has God-given intelligence ( iro)

● Ciencias de la Educación

fpl Education

● Ciencias de la Información

fpl Media Studies

● Ciencias Empresariales

fpl Business Studies

● ciencias exactas

fpl exact sciences

● ciencias naturales

fpl natural science(s)

● ciencias ocultas

fpl occultism

● Ciencias Políticas

fpl Political Science, Politics

* * *

ciencia sustantivo femenino
a) ( rama del saber) science;

(saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning;
◊ ciencia ficción science fiction;

a ciencia cierta for sure, for certain
b)

◊ ciencias sustantivo femenino plural (Educ) science;

Cciencias Empresariales/de la Información Business/Media Studies;
Cciencias Políticas/de la Educación Politics/Education
ciencia sustantivo femenino
1 science
2 frml (conocimiento) knowledge: descorchar un botella no tiene mucha ciencia, there is no mystery about uncorking a bottle
3 ciencia ficción, science fiction
irón ciencia infusa, divine inspiration
ciencias ocultas, the occult sing
♦ Locuciones: a ciencia cierta, for certain: lo sé a ciencia cierta, I'm absolutely sure o I know it for certain
' ciencia' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
divulgación
- estadística
- interés
- jurisprudencia
- mecánica
- óptica
- ortopedia
- padre
- ramo
- reino
- toponimia
- acústica
- adelanto
- aeronáutica
- avanzar
- contabilidad
- dedicar
- economía
- evolucionar
- ramificarse
- triunfo
- veterinaria
English:
advancement
- area
- branch
- certain
- data processing
- economics
- electronic
- forestry
- medicine
- sci-fi
- science
- science fiction
- statistics
- surgery
- social
- wishful thinking

* * *

ciencia

♦ nf

1. [método, estudio] science;

la ciencia ya no puede hacer nada para salvar al enfermo science is unable to do anything more to help the patient;

la astronomía es la ciencia que estudia los cuerpos celestes astronomy is the science in which heavenly bodies are studied

Comp
ciencias aplicadas applied sciences;
ciencias biológicas life sciences;

ciencia del conocimiento cognitive science;

ciencias económicas economics [singular];

ciencias empresariales business studies;

ciencias exactas mathematics [singular];

ciencia ficción science fiction;

ciencias físicas physical sciences;

ciencias de la información media studies;

ciencias naturales natural sciences;

ciencias ocultas occultism;

ciencias políticas political science;

ciencias de la salud medical sciences;

ciencias sociales social sciences;

ciencias de la Tierra earth sciences

2. [sabiduría] learning, knowledge;

Comp
Fam
tener poca ciencia to be straightforward;

la cocina tiene poca ciencia, pero requiere mucho sentido común cooking doesn't require a lot of skill, but you do need to use common sense;

Comp
Hum
por ciencia infusa through divine inspiration

3. Educ
ciencias science;

soy de ciencias I studied science

Comp
ciencias mixtas = secondary school course comprising mainly science subjects but including some arts subjects;
ciencias puras = secondary school course comprising science subjects only

♦ a ciencia cierta loc adv

for certain;

no se conoce a ciencia cierta el número de víctimas the number of victims isn't known for certain

* * *

ciencia

f

1 science;

a ciencia cierta for certain, for sure;

ser un pozo de ciencia fam be a fount of knowledge

2

:

ciencias pl EDU science sg ;

ciencias (naturales) natural sciences

* * *

ciencia nf

1) : science

2) : learning, knowledge

3)

a ciencia cierta : for a fact, for certain

* * *

ciencia n science

los avances de la ciencia the advances of science

ciencia ficción science fiction

ciencias naturales biology

ciencias políticas politics

Spanish-English dictionary > ciencia
12 Mind

   1) To Know the Different Operations of the Mind

   It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reﬂection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reﬂection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)

   2) The Mind Is Furnished by Experience

   Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)

   3) Mythical Thought Is as Rigorous as That of Modern Science

   The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)

   4) The Mind Has Nothing But Itself to Know Itself

   MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)

   5) To Know Is to Represent Accurately

   [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)

   6) The Question of Mind in Relation to Machine

   Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)

   7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses

   Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have ﬂourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....

   Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.

   In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.

   The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)

   8) Approaches to the Study of the Mind

   Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.

... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
13 естественные науки

1. sciences

военная наука — the science of warfare

оккультные науки — the occult sciences

основы науки — the elements of science

учёный; человек науки — man of science

финансовая наука — science of finances

2. natural sciences

наука управления — management science

ради науки — in the cause of science

наука о языке — the science of language

развитие науки — advancement of science

фундамент науки — foundation of science

3. philosophy

доктор философских наук — Doctor of Philosophy

4. science

репортер по науке — science reporter

упадок науки — declension of science

заниматься наукой — to pursue science

«Христианская наука» — Christian Science

наука и техника — science and technology

Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > естественные науки
14 Henry, Joseph

SUBJECT AREA: Electricity, Telecommunications

[br]

b. 17 December 1797 Albany, New York, USA

d. 13 May 1878 Washington, DC, USA

[br]

American scientist after whom the unit of inductance is named.

[br]

Sent to stay with relatives at the age of 6 because of the illness of his father, when the latter died in 1811 Henry was apprenticed to a silversmith and then turned to the stage. Whilst he was ill himself, a book on science fired his interest and he began studying at Albany Academy, working as a tutor to finance his studies. Initially intending to pursue medicine, he then spent some time as a surveyor before becoming Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy at Albany Academy in 1826. There he became interested in the improvement of electromagnets and discovered that the use of an increased number of turns of wire round the core greatly increased their power; by 1831 he was able to supply to Yale a magnet capable of lifting almost a ton weight. During this time he also discovered the principles of magnetic induction and self-inductance. In the same year he made, but did not patent, a cable telegraph system capable of working over a distance of 1 mile (1.6 km). It was at this time, too, that he found that adiabatic expansion of gases led to their sudden cooling, thus paving the way for the development of refrigerators. For this he was recommended for, but never received, the Copley Medal of the Royal Society. Five years later he became Professor of Natural Philosophy at New Jersey College (later Princeton University), where he deduced the laws governing the operation of transformers and observed that changes in magnetic flux induced electric currents in conductors. Later he also observed that spark discharges caused electrical effects at a distance. He therefore came close to the discovery of radio waves. In 1836 he was granted a year's leave of absence and travelled to Europe, where he was able to meet Michael Faraday. It was with his help that in 1844 Samuel Morse set up the first patented electric telegraph, but, sadly, the latter seems to have reaped all the credit and financial rewards. In 1846 he became the first secretary of the Washington Smithsonian Institute and did much to develop government support for scientific research. As a result of his efforts some 500 telegraph stations across the country were equipped with meteorological equipment to supply weather information by telegraph to a central location, a facility that eventually became the US National Weather Bureau. From 1852 he was a member of the Lighthouse Board, contributing to improvements in lighting and sound warning systems and becoming its chairman in 1871. During the Civil War he was a technical advisor to President Lincoln. He was a founder of the National Academy of Science and served as its President for eleven years.

[br]

Principal Honours and Distinctions

President, American Association for the Advancement of Science 1849. President, National Academy of Science 1893–1904. In 1893, to honour his work on induction, the International Congress of Electricians adopted the henry as the unit of inductance.

Bibliography

1824. "On the chemical and mechanical effects of steam". 1825. "The production of cold by the rarefaction of air".

1832, "On the production of currents \& sparks of electricity \& magnetism", American

Journal of Science 22:403.

"Theory of the so-called imponderables", Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 6:84.

Further Reading

Smithsonian Institution, 1886, Joseph Henry, Scientific Writings, Washington DC.

KF

Biographical history of technology > Henry, Joseph
15 Logical Empiricism

   1) The Value of Modern Analytical Empiricism

   Modern analytical empiricism... differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, as compared with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought: I also have no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble.... Take such questions as: What is number? What are space and time? What is mind, and what is matter? I do not say that we can here and now give definitive answers to all these ancient questions, but I do say that a method has been discovered by which, as in science, we can make successive approximations to the truth, in which each new stage results from an improvement, not a rejection, of what has gone before. (Russell, 1961, pp. 788-789)

   2) The Grand Theses of Logical Empiricism Have Not Turned out to Be Correct

   Not a single one of the great theses of Logical Empiricism (that Meaning is Method of Verification; that metaphysical propositions are literally without sense; that Mathematics is True by Convention) has turned out to be correct. It detracts from the excitement of the fact that, by turning philosophical theses into linguistic ones [as Carnap had tried to do]... one can make philosophy more scientific and settle the truth value of philosophical propositions by hard scientific research, if the results one obtains are uniformly negative. (Putnam, 1975, p. 20)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Logical Empiricism
16 representante

adj.

representative.

f. & m.

1 representative (gen) & (commerce).

2 agent.

* * *

representante

► adjetivo

1 representative

► nombre masulino o femenino

1 representative

2 (actor) actor; (actriz) actress

* * *

noun mf.

representative

* * *

SMF

1) [de organización, país, en parlamento] representative

la única representante española en esta prueba — Spain's only representative in this event

uno de los máximos representantes del surrealismo — one of the greatest exponents o representatives of surrealism

representante legal — legal representative

representante sindical — union representative

2) (Com) representative

3) [de artista, deportista] agent

4) † (=actor) performer, actor/actress

* * *

masculino y femenino representative

es representante de una editorial — she represents a publishing house

ganó la representante brasileña — the Brazilian contestant won

- representante de la ley

* * *

= proxy, representative, umbrella, nominee, exponent, figurehead, byword, officer, spokesman [spokesmen, -pl.], spokeswoman [spokeswomen, -pl.].

Nota: Femenino.

Ex. This article suggests that 'form of material' should be used to serve as a proxy for information content analysis in the case of archival material.

Ex. CAG's membership consists basically of representatives from each of the British library co-operative.

Ex. SCOCLIS is the umbrella body for the 30 UK local networks which deal in commercial and technical information resources.

Ex. A local coordinating committee was also established for the course, consisting of the President (or his nominee), the local coordinator and the local tutors.

Ex. The Commission of the European Communities is also the exponent of Community as distinct from national interests in the Council of Ministers.

Ex. This book is a biography of Mary Baker Eddy, a woman who became the figurehead for the medico-religious movement of Christian Science.

Ex. Hackman became a byword for everything that was authentic about the cerebral American New Wave of the late 1960s and 1970s.

Ex. Thus, sometimes the information does not reach those officers who would benefit most from access to it.

Ex. The philosophy of these critics was enunciated by one of their most prominent spokesmen, the famous Thomas Carlyle.

Ex. The UK Labour Party spokeswoman on information technology reviewed some of the future applications of the information superhighway to education.

----

* Cámara de Representantes = House of Representatives.

* grupo de representantes = focus group.

* representante comercial = company representative, business traveller.

* representante de laboratorio farmacéutico = pharmaceutical company representative.

* representante de la comunidad = community activist.

* representante de los estudiantes = student representative.

* representante de productos farmacéuticos = pharmaceutical company representative.

* representante de ventas = sales rep, sales representative.

* representante militar = army official, army officer.

* representante oficial = game official.

* representante sindical = trade union shop steward, shop steward, steward, union steward, trade union official.

* visita de representante = sales call.

* * *

masculino y femenino representative

es representante de una editorial — she represents a publishing house

ganó la representante brasileña — the Brazilian contestant won

- representante de la ley

* * *

= proxy, representative, umbrella, nominee, exponent, figurehead, byword, officer, spokesman [spokesmen, -pl.], spokeswoman [spokeswomen, -pl.].

Nota: Femenino.

Ex: This article suggests that 'form of material' should be used to serve as a proxy for information content analysis in the case of archival material.

Ex: CAG's membership consists basically of representatives from each of the British library co-operative.

Ex: SCOCLIS is the umbrella body for the 30 UK local networks which deal in commercial and technical information resources.

Ex: A local coordinating committee was also established for the course, consisting of the President (or his nominee), the local coordinator and the local tutors.

Ex: The Commission of the European Communities is also the exponent of Community as distinct from national interests in the Council of Ministers.

Ex: This book is a biography of Mary Baker Eddy, a woman who became the figurehead for the medico-religious movement of Christian Science.

Ex: Hackman became a byword for everything that was authentic about the cerebral American New Wave of the late 1960s and 1970s.

Ex: Thus, sometimes the information does not reach those officers who would benefit most from access to it.

Ex: The philosophy of these critics was enunciated by one of their most prominent spokesmen, the famous Thomas Carlyle.

Ex: The UK Labour Party spokeswoman on information technology reviewed some of the future applications of the information superhighway to education.

* Cámara de Representantes = House of Representatives.

* grupo de representantes = focus group.

* representante comercial = company representative, business traveller.

* representante de laboratorio farmacéutico = pharmaceutical company representative.

* representante de la comunidad = community activist.

* representante de los estudiantes = student representative.

* representante de productos farmacéuticos = pharmaceutical company representative.

* representante de ventas = sales rep, sales representative.

* representante militar = army official, army officer.

* representante oficial = game official.

* representante sindical = trade union shop steward, shop steward, steward, union steward, trade union official.

* visita de representante = sales call.

* * *

representante

masculine and feminine

1 (de una persona, organización) representative; ( Com) representative

es representante de una editorial she represents a publishing house

ganó la representante brasileña the Brazilian contestant won

2 (diputado) representative

Compuesto:

representante de la ley

( period); officer of the law

* * *

representante sustantivo masculino y femenino
representative;
(de artista, cantante) agent;
◊ es representante de una editorial she represents a publishing house

representante
I adjetivo representative
II mf
1 representative
2 (de un artista) agent, manager
3 Com sales representative

' representante' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
acreditado
- acreditar
- delegado
- legítimo
- personero
- vendedor
English:
absent
- agent
- rep
- representative
- sales rep
- salesman
- saleswoman
- shop steward
- dealer
- proxy
- sales

* * *

representante

♦ adj

representative

♦ nmf
[delegado] representative;
ganó el festival el representante irlandés the contestant representing Ireland won the contest;

representante (artístico) agent;

representante (comercial) (sales) rep

Comp
representante exclusivo(a) sole representative;
representante sindical union rep o representative

* * *

representante

m/f tb COM representative

* * *

representante nmf

1) : representative

2) : performer

* * *

representante n representative

Spanish-English dictionary > representante
17 Knowledge

   1) To Exist Is to Be Perceived

   It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)

   2) Abstract Science or Demonstration Is a More Perfect Species of Knowledge

   It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.

   But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reﬂection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)

   3) Knowledge Derives from Two Fundamental Sources of the Mind

   Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).

   Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])

   4) The Means by Which Metaphysics Can Be Perfected as a Science

   Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....

   This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)

   5) Knowledge Is Only Real in the Form of System

   Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)

   6) Knowledge, Action, and Evaluation Are Interconnected

   Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)

   7) The Evolution of Knowledge

   "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.

   Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
18 Cayley, Sir George

SUBJECT AREA: Aerospace

[br]

b. 27 December 1773 Scarborough, England

d. 15 December 1857 Brompton Hall, Yorkshire, England

[br]

English pioneer who laid down the basic principles of the aeroplane in 1799 and built a manned glider in 1853.

[br]

Cayley was born into a well-to-do Yorkshire family living at Brompton Hall. He was encouraged to study mathematics, navigation and mechanics, particularly by his mother. In 1792 he succeeded to the baronetcy and took over the daunting task of revitalizing the run-down family estate.

The first aeronautical device made by Cayley was a copy of the toy helicopter invented by the Frenchmen Launoy and Bienvenu in 1784. Cayley's version, made in 1796, convinced him that a machine could "rise in the air by mechanical means", as he later wrote. He studied the aerodynamics of flight and broke away from the unsuccessful ornithopters of his predecessors. In 1799 he scratched two sketches on a silver disc: one side of the disc showed the aerodynamic force on a wing resolved into lift and drag, and on the other side he illustrated his idea for a fixed-wing aeroplane; this disc is preserved in the Science Museum in London. In 1804 he tested a small wing on the end of a whirling arm to measure its lifting power. This led to the world's first model glider, which consisted of a simple kite (the wing) mounted on a pole with an adjustable cruciform tail. A full-size glider followed in 1809 and this flew successfully unmanned. By 1809 Cayley had also investigated the lifting properties of cambered wings and produced a low-drag aerofoil section. His aim was to produce a powered aeroplane, but no suitable engines were available. Steam-engines were too heavy, but he experimented with a gunpowder motor and invented the hot-air engine in 1807. He published details of some of his aeronautical researches in 1809–10 and in 1816 he wrote a paper on airships. Then for a period of some twenty-five years he was so busy with other activities that he largely neglected his aeronautical researches. It was not until 1843, at the age of 70, that he really had time to pursue his quest for flight. The Mechanics' Magazine of 8 April 1843 published drawings of "Sir George Cayley's Aerial Carriage", which consisted of a helicopter design with four circular lifting rotors—which could be adjusted to become wings—and two pusher propellers. In 1849 he built a full-size triplane glider which lifted a boy off the ground for a brief hop. Then in 1852 he proposed a monoplane glider which could be launched from a balloon. Late in 1853 Cayley built his "new flyer", another monoplane glider, which carried his coachman as a reluctant passenger across a dale at Brompton, Cayley became involved in public affairs and was MP for Scarborough in 1832. He also took a leading part in local scientific activities and was co-founder of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1831 and of the Regent Street Polytechnic Institution in 1838.

[br]

Bibliography

Cayley wrote a number of articles and papers, the most significant being "On aerial navigation", Nicholson's Journal of Natural Philosophy (November 1809—March 1810) (published in three numbers); and two further papers with the same title in Philosophical Magazine (1816 and 1817) (both describe semi-rigid airships).

Further Reading

L.Pritchard, 1961, Sir George Cayley, London (the standard work on the life of Cayley).

C.H.Gibbs-Smith, 1962, Sir George Cayley's Aeronautics 1796–1855, London (covers his aeronautical achievements in more detail).

—1974, "Sir George Cayley, father of aerial navigation (1773–1857)", Aeronautical Journal (Royal Aeronautical Society) (April) (an updating paper).

JDS

Biographical history of technology > Cayley, Sir George
19 ASTINFO (Red Regional para el Intercambio de Información y Experiencias de la Ciencia y Tecnología en Asia y el Pacífico)

= ASTINFO (Regional Network for the Exchange of Information and Experience in Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific).

Ex. The overall approach should be in line with the philosophy of ASTINFO (Regional Network for the Exchange of Information and Experience in Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific).

Spanish-English dictionary > ASTINFO (Red Regional para el Intercambio de Información y Experiencias de la Ciencia y Tecnología en Asia y el Pacífico)
20 ASTINFO

ASTINFO (Red Regional para el Intercambio de Información y Experiencias de la Ciencia y Tecnología en Asia y el Pacífico)

= ASTINFO (Regional Network for the Exchange of Information and Experience in Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific).

Ex: The overall approach should be in line with the philosophy of ASTINFO (Regional Network for the Exchange of Information and Experience in Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific).

Spanish-English dictionary > ASTINFO

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